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Courts following the Fountainerule, recognizing the prejudice that
exists in American society, have treated race as a relevant factor in
custody proceedings in order to spare children the harmful effects
assumed a priori to result from such prejudice. But it has been clear
5
since Brown v. Board of Education"
that the existence of prejudice

does not compel courts to allow discrimination to follow in its wake.
"Is it good public policy . . . to require people who have no prejudices to conform to the standards of the prejudiced? ...[I]s it wise

to require the socially healthy to keep step with the socially ill?"61
The answer must be no.
C.

ANTHONY

CLEVELAND

Constitutional
SUSPENSION

Law-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-STUDENTS
FACING
HAVE PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS THAT QUALIFY

FOR DUE PROCESS PROTECTION.-Goss

v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).

During February and March of 1971 there was widespread student
unrest in the Columbus, Ohio, public school system. Many students
were summarily suspended for periods of up to 10 days pursuant to
applicable Ohio law., Dwight Lopez, a student at Central High School,
sexual activity, since such activity "may have no bearing whatsoever on the welfare
and upbringing of the children." Id. at 360. Although the Smothers court upheld the
modification order, it did so because the mother's personal relationships had led to
the continued presence in the home of a man to whom the children were unrelated
by law or blood. The supreme court noted that the man's nearly permanent presence
in the house, the fact that he physically disciplined the children, and his temperamental
outbursts during the natural father's visits supported the trial court's conclusion that
the mother's personal relationship with this man-rather than her sex life with himwas detrimental to the children. Id.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. MARRIAGE AcRoss THE COLOR LINE 73 (C. Larsson ed. 1965).
1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972) provides in relevant part:
The superintendent of schools . . .or the principal of a public school may suspend
a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superintendent . . .
or principal shall within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child, and the clerk of the board
of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension including the reasons
therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of a pupil so
expelled may appeal such action to the board of education . . . and shall be
permitted to be heard against the expulsion. At the request of the pupil, or
his parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney, the board may hold the hearing
in executive session but may act upon the expulsion only at a public meeting.
The board may, by a majority vote of its full membership, reinstate such pupil.
No pupil shall be suspended or expelled from any school beyond the current
semester.
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was among those suspended. The next friends of Lopez and eight
other suspended students filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
challenging the constitutionality of the Ohio statute and asking for
injunctive and declaratory relief. The students alleged that a suspension without the minimal due process safeguards of notice and a prior
hearing deprived them of the important right to an education without
due process of law contrary to the fourteenth amendment. A threejudge court found for the plaintiffs. 2 On appeal, the United States

Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez3 affirmed the decision of the lower
court, holding that students facing suspension have property4 and
liberty5 interests that qualify for due process protection under the
fourteenth amendment.
The rights of students played an insignificant role in school and
college discipline litigation prior to 1961.6 The historical restraint of
the courts in school discipline cases was due to the wide acceptance of
the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.7 Under this doctrine
teachers could exercise the same control and authority over students
as the students' parents since teachers were acting "in place of the
parents."8
In 1961, however, the doctrine of in loco parentis was challenged
and the courts entered a new era in student discipline cases. In that
year, the Fifth Circuit, in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,9 prohibited a tax-supported college from expelling students with2. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
3. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
4. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra. The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), stated that the concept of liberty includes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
6. See 47 AM. JUR. Schools §§ 173-88 (1943); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958);
79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts §§ 493-505 (1952).
7. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority during his life,
to the tutor or school master of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such
a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
8. See, e.g., North v. Board of Trustees, 27 N.E. 54 (111. 1891); Gott v. Berea College,
161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913); Anthony v. Syracuse University, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (App.
Div. 1928).
9. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). In Dixon, nine
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out providing any of the due process safeguards required by the
fourteenth amendment. The Dixon court stated that whenever an act
of a governmental body results in injury to an individual there is a
constitutional requirement that the act be done in accordance with
due process. 10 The Dixon court concluded that the interest of pupils
in notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal outweighs
11
academic administrators' interest in unfettered exercise of discretion.
Noting that procedural requirements necessary to satisfy the due process
clause depend on the circumstances, individual rights, and interests
involved, the court held that in school expulsion situations a trialtype hearing was not required, but at least the rudiments of an ad2
versary proceeding must be maintained.'

Although Dixon dealt with college students, the decision was
3
followed by some courts with respect to secondary school students.'
As the number of student discipline cases increased, the due process
rights of expelled 1 4 or indefinitely suspended students eventually became firmly established." However, confusion and a lack of uniformity
state college pupils who participated in peaceful demonstrations were expelled by the
Alabama Board of Education for misconduct. The notices of expulsion mailed to the
plaintiffs stated no reason for the action taken, and at no time were the plaintiffs
provided with an opportunity to appear before the board. 294 F.2d at 152-55.
10. 294 F.2d at 155.
11. Id. at 156-59.
12. In Dixon, the court stated that the accused should be provided _notice containing the specific charges, given the names of witnesses against him and a report on
their testimony, and granted an opportunity to present his own defense and produce
witnesses. The Dixon court did not go so far as to require cross-examination, and it
was clear that a formal trial did not have to be held. Id. at 158-59.
13. E.g., Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cit. 1964). Cf. Madera v. Board of
Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d, 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
There seems to be little justification for applying any different legal principles to
non-college students, particularly since the Supreme Court recognized in Tinker v.
Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that high school
students are "persons" under the Constitution and are thus entitled to exercise and
be protected by constitutional rights.
14. Expulsion is a final separation of a student from school. Stetson University v.
Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924). See also Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1969); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.
Supp. 889 (E.D. 111. 1970); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Vought
v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv.
290 (1968).
15. In cases in which a student may be expelled or indefinitely suspended, procedural due process is complied with if the student has notice of the charges against
him; has an opportunity to be heard in an informal or administrative-type hearing;
has the right to call witnesses; has the right to cross-examine witnesses; and has prior
notice of prohibited conduct which may lead to such disciplinary action. The decisions clearly do not provide all due process safeguards afforded a criminal defendant,
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marked the decisions"; involving suspensions17 for shorter, definite
periods of time.
In re Gault"' granted due process rights to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings and thus strengthened students' claims to due process
protection in school disciplinary litigation. In Gault, the Supreme
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that notice of hearing and charges, the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses be provided in juvenile court proceedings in which
a juvenile is threatened with a deprivation of his liberty based on a
determination of delinquency? 9
The Gault court based its decision in part on the serious threat
to liberty posed by juvenile proceedings.2 0 This analysis immediately
suggested that in school disciplinary proceedings the application of
due process standards should depend upon the nature and extent of
the threat to a student's liberty and not upon the "character" of the
discipline. 2 1 Numerous decisions since Gault have considered whether
due process should be accorded students in disciplinary cases. Confusion and disparity, however, continued to earmark the lower federal
court decisions relating to school suspensions. 22 Questions such as, "How
long a suspension subjects a student to a severe detriment or grievous
loss?", and "What type of hearing does due process require?", have

such as appointment of counsel at public expense, a public hearing, and process to
compel the attendance of witnesses. Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 770 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
16. A comprehensive survey of conflicting decisions may be found in Goss v. Lopez,
95 S. Ct. 729, 737 n.8 (1975).
17. Suspension is a temporary separation of a student from school. Stetson University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924).
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case involved a 15-year-old who was taken into
custody after a neighbor complained of receiving an obscene telephone call. The
juvenile's parents were not notified by the authorities, but his mother learned of his
detention from the family of another accused youth. At the detention home, the juvenile's
mother was advised that a hearing in juvenile court would be held the following day.
At the hearing, the complainant was not present, testimony was not sworn, no
transcript of the proceedings was kept, and young Gault was questioned by the judge
without him or his mother being informed of his right to remain silent or his right
to be represented by counsel. Id. at 5. The judge declared Gault delinquent-without
-resolving the issue of whether Gault was responsible for the call. The judge then
ordered Gault committed to the state reformatory until age 21. Id. at 8. The maximum
criminal penalty would have been two months. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 33-34, 41, 55, 56-57.
20. Id. at 27-28, 30-31.
21. Cf. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 558 (1971).
22. See note 16 supra.
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been answered in widely varying ways by post-Dixon and post-Gault
courts.
Goss v. Lopez should eliminate some of this confusion and disparity
in the lower federal courts. The Goss court found that by providing a
system of free public education 23 and compelling school attendance,2 4
the state had conferred a property interest on students-an entitlement
to a public education. 2 5 The decision makes it clear that once a state

has created that property right, that right may not be withdrawn from
a student on grounds of misconduct unless the requirements of the
due process clause are met. 26 The Court also found that the suspen-

sions affected due process liberty because they could impair students'
reputations. 27 The opinion stated, "If sustained and recorded, those
charges [of misconduct] could seriously damage the students' standing
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, .64 (1972) directs local authorities to provide
a free education to all residents between ages six and 21.
24. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (1972) compels attendance at school for a school
year of not less than 32 weeks.
25. 95 S. Ct. at 735-36. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the
Court summarized previous entitlement cases. In characterizing those state-conferred
benefits which had been held to rise to the level of a property interest, and hence
were subject to the due process clause, the Court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined....
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
Id. at 577.
In Goss the majority and minority opinions assumed education was more than
an abstract need or desire. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
("[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education."). The majority and minority also agreed
that state law had created an entitlement to public education. 95 S. Ct. at 735-36; id. at
742 (Powell, J., dissenting). The fundamental point of disagreement between the majority and the minority was the breadth of entitlement. Justice Powell in dissent emphasized the Roth statement that the dimensions of an entitlement, as well as its
existence, are a function of state law. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
Justice Powell reasoned that the Ohio statute that created the entitlement defined its
dimension by authorizing a principal to suspend a student for tip to 10 days. 95 S. Ct.
at 742. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972); note I supra. Hence, in the minority's
view, suspensions for less than 10 days pursuant to the state statute violated no property
interest sufficient to invoke due process requirements.
26. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
27. Id., citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
later opportunities for higher education and employment."'28
The Columbus Public School System argued that loss of 10 days
from school was neither severe nor grievous and thus the due process
clause was inapplicable.2 9 The Court rejected such contentions, stating

that so long as deprivation of property is not de minimus, the gravity
of the deprivation is irrelevant in determining whether due process is
applicable.30 The Court then stated that a 10-day suspension from
school was not de minimus and hence "may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause."' 1 The opinion added that
total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial
period . . . is a serious event in the life of a suspended child.

Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily
denied nor the liberty interest in reputation ... is so insubstantial

that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure
2
the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.3
The Court then turned to the nature of due process protection
required when students are suspended from a public school for 10
days or less. It held that in such cases the student must be given
28. 95 S. Ct. at 736. Justice Powell, writing for the minority, responded to this
reasoning by noting that in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court
had found due process liberty considerations inapplicable to a nontenured public
university teacher who was not rehired. In Goss, Justice Powell reasoned that if refusal to rehire a teacher did not create sufficient reputational detriment to make due
process considerations applicable, then the brief suspension of a teenage student would
create insufficient reputational damage to constitute a deprivation of due process liberty.
95 S. Ct. at 743-44.
Justice Powell's reading of Roth, however, seems somewhat selective. In discussing
due process liberty issues, the Roth court stated:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community....
Had it done so, this would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437. . . . In the present case, however, there is
no suggestion whatever that the respondent's interest in his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" is at stake.
408 U.S. at 573.
29. These contentions were based on language in prior cases that indicated the
due process clause was applicable to "severe," "serious," "grievous," "important," or
"significant" deprivations of property or liberty interests. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 74344 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
30. 95 S. Ct. at 737, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. 95 S.Ct. at 737.
32. Id.
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oral or written notice of the charges, and, if the student denies the
charges, an explanation of the evidence the school disciplinarian has
compiled against him. In addition, the student is to be given an
opportunity to explain his version of the story. 33 Generally, this hear34
ing should precede actual suspension except in emergency situations.
The Court rejected the requirement of trial-type procedures imposed
by some lower court decisions. 35 In the opinion of the Court, requiring
trial-type procedures would create an undue administrative burden
and hamper the educational effectiveness of disciplinary measures. 36
But an informal hearing procedure, the Court indicated, would not
interfere with the educational process and would protect the student's
interest in avoiding erroneous exclusion from school.3 7 The hearing

33. Id. at 740. The Court noted, however, that there need be no delay between
notice and hearing.
34. The Court stated:
Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an
ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed
from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should
follow as soon as practicable, as the District Court indicated.
Id. The lower court had held that in such emergency situations, due process required
that parents receive notice of suspension proceedings within 24 hours of the decision
to conduct them, and that a hearing be held in the student's presence within 72 hours
of his removal. Id., Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
35. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). There, the
court required formal procedures for disciplinary suspensions resulting in a denial of
access to regular instruction in the public schools for a period greater than two days.
Defendants shall not, on grounds of discipline, cause the exclusion, suspension,
expulsion, postponement, interschool transfer, or any other denial of access to
regular instruction in the public schools to any child for more than two days
without first notifying the child's parent or guardian of such proposed action,
the reasons therefor, and of the hearing before a Hearing Officer ....
Id. at 880.
[Such notice shall] inform the parent or guardian of the right to be represented
at the hearing by legal counsel; to examine the child's school records before the
hearing, including any tests or reports upon which the proposed action may be
based, to present evidence, including expert medical, psychological and educational testimony; and, to confront and cross-examine any school official, employee, or agent of the school district or public department who may have
evidence upon which the proposed action was based.
Id. at 881.
36. 95 S.Ct. at 740-44.
37. Id. at 741. The Court's primary concern was apparently that disciplinarians
might act on erroneous information. See id. at 739. The Court felt that effective notice
and a rudimentary, informal hearing would provide a "meaningful hedge" against
such error:
At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes about facts
and arguments about cause and effect. He may then determine himself to summon
the accuser, permit cross-examination and allow the student to present his own
witnesses. . . . In any event, his discretion will be more informed and we think
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mandated by Goss, a hearing characterized by the Court as "informal
give-and-take between student and disciplinarian, ' '8 leaves serious
problems unresolved. Although "the student will at least have the
opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems
the proper context, ' ' 9 the decision does not affect the disciplinarian's
discretion. The student is guaranteed at least some type of informal
hearing, generally to take place prior to suspension; but this is the
only "guarantee" the student possesses. This "guarantee" might very
easily be reduced to a mere formality void of meaningful due process
protection.4" The disciplinarian alone decides what action is to be
taken after the "give-and-take" session.4 1 Although his discretion will
hopefully be more informed, the risk of an unfair suspension may
42
not be substantially reduced.
The Goss Court held that the informal procedures applied
only
to suspensions of up to 10 days. 43 The Court stated more formal procedures "may" be required for longer suspensions or expulsions for
the remainder of the school term.4 4 It also suggested that "in unusual
situations" involving short suspensions more formal procedures might
45
be required.
The Court has thus invited continued confusion and disparity in
school discipline cases. Lower courts attempting to apply Goss will
have to determine whether suspensions for more than 10 days, or
short term suspensions in "unusual situations," require more formal
due process procedures than those outlined in the opinion. They
will also, of course, have to define "unusual situations." If courts conclude the Goss procedure is inadequate in cases involving long-term
suspensions or unusual situations, they will then have to decide whether
trial-type procedures are required. There is no reason to believe that
the risk of error substantially reduced.
Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. For instance, immediately following some alleged misconduct of a "troublemaker," or problem student, with emotions of both disciplinarian and student still excited
and possibly irrational, a "hearing" may become nothing more than a shouting session
of accusations and denials.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. Justice Powell found it doubtful that the procedures mandated by Goss would
add significantly to protection afforded students by existing Ohio law. He noted that
the Court's notice requirements were less stringent than those imposed by OHIO REV.
§ 3313.66 (1972), and that the informal hearing procedure outlined
CODE ANN.
by the majority only required the principal to "listen to the student's 'version of
events.' " 95 S. Ct. at 747.
43. 95 S. Ct. at 741.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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judicial efforts to interpret the unclear language in Goss will be any
more uniform and consistent than pre-Goss efforts to decide what due
process rights were applicable when a student was suspended for a
short period.

4

1

Nonetheless, this decision may at long last bring much-needed
judicial scrutiny to what was formerly the exclusive domain of educators and administrators. Justice Powell, calling attention to the
"new 'thicket' the court now enters, ' ' 47 aptly characterized many of
the discretionary decisions in the educational process which may now
be subject to judicial scrutiny. 4 These decisions range from grading
students' academic performance to tracking students into a particular
academic program.
The Goss Court, in discussing due process liberty, stated that suspensions of up to 10 days might "seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
later opportunities for higher education and employment." 49 If damage to a student's standing and future opportunities constitutes a deprivation of liberty, many of the discretionary decisions pointed out
by Justice Powell will now be subject to judicial review for due process
defects. The most obvious of these is the decision to classify50 or
track 5' students.
46. See note 16 supra.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 747.
48. The dissent noted eight of the many decisions made by teachers and other
school authorities that may have serious consequences upon the students: (1) grading
student work, (2) passing or failing students in a particular course, (3) promoting
students, (4) requiring students to take certain subjects, (5) excluding students from
interscholastic athletics or extracurricular activities, (6) removing a student from one
school to another, (7) busing students, (8) classifying or tracking students. 95 S. Ct.
at 747-48.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 736. The lower court felt that students respond to suspension in
one or more of the following ways:
1. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem.
2. The student feels powerless and helpless.
3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resentment, suspicion
and fear.
4. The student learns withdrawal as a mode of problem solving.
5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the suspension. He does
not know what offending acts he committed.
6. The student is stigmatized by his teachers and school administrators as a
deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker in the future.
372 F. Supp. at 1292.
50. "Classification describes the welter of schooling practices which render differentiated judgments of academic worth or potential .... ." Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The
Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classifications, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705,
710 (1973).
51. "Tracking" refers to the differential classification of students, usually on the
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Public schools classify or sort students in a variety of ways. 52 From
the moment a child enters kindergarten until he graduates from high
school, he is tested at regular intervals. These tests together with
grades and teacher recommendations determine into which classification the child is placed. The child may be placed in the "ineducable"
class and excluded from school; 53 or he may be placed in special education or exceptional child programs; 54 or the child may be placed in
the regular school but classified or tracked according to measured
ability-fast learner, average learner, or slow learner. Exclusion results in absolute deprivation of the state-created right to an education
and has been overturned by a number of courts;5 5 additionally, there
basis of "measured" aptitude, for instruction in the regular academic program. W.
& M. BRYAN, ABILITY GROUPING: 1970, at 4 (1971).
The predominance of tracking in American public school systems may reflect the
fact that such classification practices enjoy wide popularity among teachers. According
to one study, only 18.4% of surveyed teachers preferred to teach non-tracked classes.
Research Division, National Education Association, Teacher's Opinion Poll: Ability
Grouping, 57 NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N J., Feb. 1968, at 53.
See generally Buss, supra note 21. See also Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in
52.
Public Schools, 24 HAST. L.J. 1129, 1132-33 (1973).
53. As many as 60% of the school-age children labeled retarded may not be receiving an education. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MR 69 TOWARD
PROGRExSS: THE STORY OF A DECADE 18 (1969), cited in Dimond, The Constitutional Right
to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HAST. L.J. 1087, 1089 n.7 (1973).
Many compulsory attendance laws contain exceptions that may be applied to children
with mental or physical handicaps. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010(b)(3) (1973); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-106(2) (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-203 (1973); MR. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 911 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3208(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.05 (1972); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 13-27-4 (1967);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.033(2) (Supp. 1974). It has been asserted that for some
handicapped children such provisions amount to compulsory non-attendance laws.
Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing
Issue, 23 SYR. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (1972).
54. Special education or exceptional child programs are usually referred to as
EMR-educable mentally retarded-programs.
55. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (exclusion because of alleged ineducability due to behavioral problems, mental retardation, emotional disturbances or hyperactivity); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (exclusion due to mental retardation);
Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971) (exclusion due to pregnancy);
Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970) (exclusion due to alien status). In these
cases the classification determinations were overturned because of the failure to provide
some education and an adequate hearing prior to exclusion.
Both the Mills and Pennsylvania Association cases spelled out constitutionally
acceptable procedures for prior evaluation and for periodic review after placement.
Those cases hold that no child shall be recommended for a special class, excluded from
a regular class, or subjected to other significant change in educational status without,
in the language of Mills, a "constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative."
348 F. Supp. at 878.
FINDLEY
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is substantial support in educational literature for the contention that
placement in special education programs or in the lower ability tracks
stigmatizes students.56 Thus classification decisions may adversely affect
the reputational interests referred to in Goss.
The Mills and Pennsylvania Association cases suggest the following are required:
1. Timely evaluation and placement of any child found to be ineducable in the
public schools.
2. Public notification by the media, and personal notice to known children affected,
of the newly enforceable rights to some education and to a hearing on appropriate
educational programs.
3. A full evaluation of the child's needs by competent experts and development of
a specific plan.
4. Submission to the family of the proposed placement, accompanied by reasons,
with notice of opportunity for hearing before placement, and notice of availability of
assistance essential in evaluating the proposed placement in preparing for a hearing.
Notice must actually inform the family of all of the above in terminology understandable to the family.
5. Expungement and clarification of any statements by the family made in the
course of a prior determination conducted without fair procedures.
6. A burden of proof on school authorities at the hearing as to all facts and as to
the propriety of placement in other than a regular class-all in the context of a presumption that placement in a regular public school class, with appropriate auxiliary
services, is preferable to any other placement.
7. The right to a representative of the student's choice, including legal counsel.
8. An open or closed hearing at the discretion of the parent or guardian.
9. A record of the hearing.
10. A hearing officer independent of the local school system.
11. Prior to hearing, access to all public school system records pertaining to the
child.
12. The opportunity to cross-examine any witness testifying for the school.
13. The opportunity to present contradictory evidence.
14. Maintenance of the child's educational status pending resolution of the dispute,
unless the parents consent to a change.
56. See Borg, Ability Grouping in the Public Schools, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC.,
Winter 1965, at I; Mann, What Does Ability Grouping Do to the Self-Concept?, 36
CHILDHOOD EDUC. 357 (1960). Cf. GOLDBERG, PASSOW & JUSTMAN, THE EFFECTS OF ABILITY
GROUPING (1966).

There is also substantial support in educational literature for the proposition that
low expectations of classroom instructors reduce the motivation of children in low ability
tracks. The child who perceives that he is considered a school failure and who feels
ignored may respond by being a problem student-provoking the teacher and refusing to
do assignments. As a result, such children fail to develop the social skills which might
lead to a more constructive response to their educational opportunities. See, e.g., C.
JENKS, THE COLEMAN
REPORT AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
(1970); Comer, The Circle
Game in Tracking, 12 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 25 (1972).
As Judge Skelly Wright said in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491-92 (D.D.C.
1967),
The real tragedy of misjudgments about the disadvantaged student's abilities
is . . . the likelihood that the student will act out that judgment and confirm it
by achieving only at the expected level. Indeed, it may be even worse than that,
for there is strong evidence that performance in fact declines. . . . And while
the tragedy of misjudgments can occur even under the best of circumstances,
there is reason to believe the track system compounds the risk.
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In the past, courts have been reluctant to grant due process protection in student classification cases, claiming lack of expertise in
matters of a purely educational nature. 57 On the basis of the Goss
rationale, however, due process procedures may now be required
before the classification is put into effect. 58
Problems, however, will arise if the informal Goss procedures are
applied to student classification issues. Students will, in most instances,
be unable to protect themselves against unfair classification decisions;
students are unlikely to have sufficient background or experience to
convince school counselors that a classification would be educationally unsound. Conversely, students will not be able to effectively and objectively evaluate the educational reasons given by the school for such
a classification. 59 In student classification areas, the Goss procedures
60
seem insufficient to guarantee students their constitutional rights.
See also Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Moses v. Washington
Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), afl'd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).
57. Indeed numerous cases have recognized the propriety of educational classification based solely on academic competence. See, e.g., Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir. 1957); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 230 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Fla. 1964).
As the court declared in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55,
61 (5th Cir. 1964), "[I]t goes without saying that there is no constitutional prohibition
against an assignment of individual students to particular schools on a basis of intelligence, achievement or other aptitudes upon a uniformly administered program .... "
Following Stell, the court in Miller v. School Dist. No. 2, 256 F. Supp. 370 (D.S.C. 1966),
permitted a school district to divide students into slow or accelerated sections and to
center its vocational curriculum at one school for financial or pragmatic reasons.
Although courts have generally been reluctant to challenge scholastic classifications
or to make judicial determinations of educational needs, courts have felt compelled to
act when it was apparent that some educational need existed and that school officials
were providing no education. See note 55 supra. Otherwise, classifications are viewed
as essentially scholastic decisions, better left to the school authorities.
However, a judicial role has been found when racial disparities or racial separation
resulted from school classification practices. Such decisions, however, are usually based
upon a denial of equal protection of the laws for a particular class of individuals. See,
e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032
(1970); Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962).
58. A distinction may be drawn between disciplinary decisions involved in suspension
cases and educational decisions involved in classification litigation. However, when one
looks to the nature of the threat to a student's liberty and not to the character of the
discipline or classification, the distinction becomes irrelevant for due process purposes.
59. Cf. Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
in which the court, when faced with a suspension problem, indicated that high school
students as minors occupy a special status under the law because they are too inexperienced to know how to protect themselves against charges of misconduct.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether many parents would be able to meaningfully and
successfully challenge a school classification decision. See note 60 infra.
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With the Goss decision the Court has indeed plunged into a
"new thicket." Significant questions remain unanswered, but the Court
has at least suggested its willingness to evaluate the due process rights
of school-age children. The Goss guidelines are far from comprehensive,
even as to school suspensions. Though decisions attempting to follow
these guidelines may therefore produce disparate results, it seems inevitable that the due process rights of school children will be more
closely examined than ever before.
In the final analysis, the Goss ruling on disciplinary proceedings
may prove to be but a minor facet of a larger problem. Goss v. Lopez,
for all its caution, may prove to be the first step towards judicial review of educators' discretion in areas far more complex than student
suspensions. It is at least clear that teachers and school administrators
must begin to consider the due process implications of a wide range
of decisions affecting their pupils' futures.
STEPHEN

J.

KUBIK

Evidence-ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE-PUBLIC DEFENDER NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISQUALIFIED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FROM ExAMINING

WITNESS

WHO

NEGOTIATES

FORMER CODEFENDANT.-Olds

PLEA

AND

TESTIFIES

AGAINST

v. State, 302 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist.

Ct. App. 1974).
The appellant, an attorney for the public defender's office, was held
in contempt of court for attempting to impeach a critical prosecution
witness. The conviction resulted from the representation of multiple
defendants by the public defender.
V. L. Odums and Clarence Perry had been charged with first degree murder. The public defender was appointed to represent both of
them. Appellant represented Perry; another member of the staff was

assigned to defend Odums. Odums subsequently pled guilty to a lesser
charge. After being sentenced, Odums appeared as a prosecution wit60. Professor Kirp feels a trial-like procedure is necessary to guarantee the due
process rights of the student in a classification dispute:
[E]ffective review of the decision requires both access to the school's records and
the opportunity to have the school's determination reviewed by an impartial
outside authority. Unless parents can examine test scores, psychological interview writeups, teacher recommendations and the like, the school's decision is
not only unchallengeable; it is simply incomprehensible. And unless the parents
can obtain the services of a disinterested professional, they may well lack the
competence to understand the basis of the school's action.
Kirp, supra note 50, at 788-89.

